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with morality, simply because it renders any sort of voluntary adjustment to environment impossible, and consequently responsibility and corrective punishment. I see absolutely no reason for discussing this threadbare question of free-will and responsibility unless we distinguish carefully between the various meanings of the term. We can never get to any satisfactory conclusion whatever until we do so. The contradictions, paradoxes, and confusion so often complained of as making the problem insoluble are nothing more nor less than the result of equivocations, which it is the first business of the philosopher to get rid of. They are due either to intellectual indolence or an imperfect knowledge of logic and psychology, and nothing is so annoying as to see men arranging themselves on two sides of the question when there are probably as many as half a dozen sides to it or more. Of course, it would not make any difference, were it not that readers who have to rely upon authority for their convictions are constantly led astray by half truths and ally themselves with false movements for the lack of the means to protect themselves against illusions. Those who do not realize the equivocations in the discussion draw conclusions in regard to responsibility that would easily be avoided if they were warned about the ambiguity of the premises.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL PROBLEM. Edited by Bernard Bosanquet. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

This interesting book, as the preface tells us, is meant to fill a gap—the gap between trained observation in the social field and reasonable theory. The trained observation is represented by a dozen lectures or papers by Miss H. Dendy, Mr. C. S. Loch, and Mrs. M. M. McCallum, which are full of the reality which comes of direct personal contact with social fact, and the theory by six chapters which are admirable specimens of the firm philosophic touch, reassuring earnestness, and cultivated, clear-headed sincerity of Mr. Bernard Bosanquet. It would, however, be an injustice to treat these aspects as two, and most of all an injustice to writers with whom it is a conviction that facts, however impressively arrayed, are, apart from theory, barren if not misleading, and

theory, apart from facts, unreal and empty. The observers here see with their minds, and the theorist, himself an acute and experienced observer, at times startles us by his suddenness of descent from philosophic discourse on social organization and moral character to homely illustrative detail drawn from the nursing of the poor, or the pauperisation of the unemployed: "To me, at least," he characteristically remarks, "the concrete and inclusive point of view is always truly idealist" (p. 105). It is, in fact, just in this way that "the gap" is filled. Rightly Mr. Bosanquet predicts that "ethical economics are not to be constructed like Dicken's Chinese Metaphysics;" rightly he hazards the home-truth that "much of the writing of our reforming publicists and economists gives me the impression of the work of students who have not experienced the look and feel and reaction of character in classes other than their own" (p. 106). As rightly does Mr. Loch begin his contribution upon "Returns in Social Science" by the animadversion that figures are used "as sticks, staves, missiles, or professor's pointers," and end it by the suggestion that in statistics that touch the domain of character we need "finer instruments and a finer use of instruments;" and even more impressively, in "The Children of Working London," "Old Pensioners," and "The Meaning and Methods of True Charity,"—chapters full of practical pity, discrimination, humor, and charm,—does Miss Dendy show how to the instructed eye of the genuinely human worker "cases" may be transformed into the lives, sometimes tragical, sometimes comical, always interesting, of flesh and blood men and women. The contents of the volume are, in short, though on first glance a trifle desultory, bound strongly together by the central principle that "the individual member of society is, above all things, a character and a will," and that therefore "in social reform character is the condition of conditions." "Though men may suffer," says Mr. Bosanquet, "through the character of others, they can gain and retain no permanent advantage excepting through their own" (Preface); and it is this principle which runs through these "Aspects," alike in observation, in criticism, and in theory. For to Mr. Bosanquet and his collaborators, the moral point of view does not begin and end in a question of desert or want of desert in their unfortunate fellow-men. "Which amongst us," asks Miss Dendy—in a context where she suggests the substitution of "helpable" for "deserving,"—shall we elevate to the awful position of arbiter as to who is and who is not deserving?" (p. 171). Or, again, "Perhaps it is be-

cause we have so habituated ourselves to regarding character from the point of view of merit only, that we rarely attempt to approach it as impartial students of cause and effect" (p. 169). Rather it is the burly moral spirit that takes the concrete individual as it finds him in garret, refuge, back-court, or work-house, studies him, helps him, or refuses to help him (for it is part of the menage of these good Samaritans to testify against "the bad Samaritans"), being in all it does, or refuses to do, increasingly convinced that all hopes of permanent betterment can only come through action on the character.

It follows that the book is, in a sense, profoundly individualistic. "Those may sneer at strength who do not believe that reason in the ultimate power," writes Mr. Bosanquet, "but those who hold a different conviction cannot but judge that the survival of the most vigorous in the struggle for the existence which is aimed at is, on the whole, the survival of the most reasonable" ("Socialism and Natural Selection," p. 297). Or, again, "I desiderate for every one, for their own sake, some possibility of falling into distress by lack of wisdom and exertion" (p. 300). Or, again, "I desire to call attention to the frightful dangers that attend any over-riding of what is relatively natural selection through family responsibility, by the direct interference of administrative or other philanthropy" (p. 301). Or, again, "I have heard of a lad who was morally murdered by benevolent ladies" (cf. context in "Character and Causation" (p. 117). No one who knows the drift of his thought will take these passages to mean that Mr. Bosanquet has been perverted to the fallacies of abstract individualism. This could not be. His two opening lectures on "The Duties of Citizenship" bid us hark back to Greece, so that, lost in the chaotic wilderness of modern interests, we may thereby learn "to understand our whole lives in the light of citizen ideas" (p. 9). He writes a chapter to refute our social atomists by proving "the Reality of the General Will." It is part of his credo that the State by its initiative may develop the lives of its citizens (p. 291). He even, with perhaps an undue truculence, would have Mr. Spencer, for his dogmatic biological pseudo-individualism, consigned to the lowest circle in the inferno (p. 295).

Yet the substantial fact remains. From first to last in his treatment alike of voluntary and State intervention, in his handling of the family, in his justification of private property, he is fearful of the unwisdom which, working havoc in the name of help, may

cut the sinews of individual responsibility. He has short shrift for the cry that "something can be done" for the industrial residuum; he declares that "nothing can be done, so long as we teach by precept and in practice that to fit yourself for a positive function is not the only avenue to life in a civilized community" (p. 116). He is at one with Mr. Kidd (though somehow he seems unnecessarily uneasy at finding himself with such an ally) in sharply distinguishing the true socialism that furnishes the opportunity for competition and the false socialism that suppresses it (p. 291). Particularly interesting in this connection is his chapter on the General Will. To him the general will exists in "the actual tendency of the whole process in which the necessary organizing ideas of all individual minds in the community are factors" (p. 327). But then he is far from holding that actual tendency is conscious tendency. And it is striking to find one who is nothing less than an apostle of enlightenment, confessing that, "on the whole, we are to the structure of legal, political, and economic organization like coral insects to a coral reef" (p. 328). If we are, especially if we reflect that the human coral insect has a rare faculty of blundering, we have surely here a reason why the best of us should think twice before enforcing on society our conscious ends, whether they take the shape of what has in these pages been called "social surgery" or that of some less organic operation. It is just here, indeed, that we find in Mr. Bosanquet's doctrine a sharp antithesis. It is manifestly a main part of his purpose to enjoin what he says is the true task of an Ethical Society—"the task of *learning to see* in the world of ethical realities" (p. 104). He is not the man to fear that the task is vain. Assuredly in his own person and practice he furnishes a proof to the contrary. As little is the insight gained to be the mere spectator's interest. For he is as practical as he is penetrating, and he would have others, if they take care to understand what they touch, be practical likewise. And yet we are—coral insects, or, not unduly to press a simile, unconscious workers in a process which "always needs the future to explain its real tendency" (p. 329). This, of course, need not mean that the light in us is darkness, and that an ordinary citizen cannot see the duties that lie nearest to hand—see them, and, if he will take pains, understand them. But assuredly it furnishes a presumption against all sweeping schemes of collective interference.

In this connection it is further characteristic of Mr. Bosanquet that he has an evident preference for the life of the citizen who

unobtrusively lives a home life and works among his neighbors, trusting to the opportunities of human intercourse which willing eyes may always find, and something like a distrust of the more self-conscious and pretentious movements which are so apt to be headlong, puny, and uninstructed. "I confess," he says, "to a certain feeling of terror when I think of the increasing number of centres where groups of inexperienced young men or young women have come together burning 'to do good,' and, so far as I am aware, without any special provision for acquainting themselves with the conditions of their task" (p. 25). "It is an illusion," he tells us, to think "that duties which deal with public matters are the only public duties." This is needful doctrine. Nor is it the least of the merits of these papers that, in the light they give as to how this personal and more private work is done—with how much human interest, patience, knowledge—and likewise as to why it ought to be done, they furnish a strong appeal, not the less suasive because indirect, which ought to enlist in social work that best kind of recruit, who to brotherly kindness adds charity, and to charity unobtrusiveness, and to unobtrusiveness enlightenment.

It is unreasonable, perhaps, when so much is good to ask for more. But it ought, perhaps, to be said in conclusion that, in a volume which deals to so considerable an extent with the basis and justification of social work, many readers would welcome some fuller recognition of the value of religious agencies and religious ideas. "Any one," says Mr. Bosanquet, "brought up with an exclusive feeling for any visible church has a great difficulty in grasping a spiritual connection with the community as such" (p. 7). If "exclusive" here refers to a peculiarly deeply dyed and repulsive sectarianism, the statement need not be disputed. But this does not alter the fact that many persons who belong to them think that even visible churches go far to bring into men's lives precisely that sense of membership in a larger life, and that recognition of the worth even of the worthless, which social thinkers and workers like Mr. Bosanquet so powerfully enforce. But be this so or not, it is the very spirituality which runs through Mr. Bosanquet's doctrine which encourages readers to wish for some further considerations to sustain their practical respect for men who have ceased to be respectable, and to confirm their devotion to communities upon whose woful imperfections the satirist and the reformer are so well agreed. Theory must, no doubt, in a volume

of this kind, be kept within bounds. But when it can be made so practical as it is here one cannot help, for the sake of the work of social reform, wishing for an additional chapter upon the spiritual basis of social and individual life.

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EINLEITUNG IN DIE MORALWISSENSCHAFT. Zweiter-Band. Von Georg Simmel. Berlin: W. Hertz, 1893. Pp. vii., 426.

The author's stand-point with regard to the elaboration of the particular ethical concepts into a systematic whole is again made unmistakably apparent in this, the second volume of his work. It might be called a negative stand-point.* Respecting all the various ethical concepts which he has exhaustively criticised, Simmel says, "I have thus endeavored to show in my present inquiries that every one of these fundamental ethical ideas includes a number of heterogeneous contents and meanings, that they are partly the rough summing up of the phenomena, partly mere names for them, names which, in consequence of the illusion of which Platonism is the typical example, have been taken for explanatory causes." Instead of a "science" of Ethics, Simmel calls for a study of the given phenomena of the moral life. To use an expression of G. Th. Fechner's, what he wants is "ethics from below," rather than "ethics from above."

It is the same demand which has long since received recognition in other branches of science; in political economy, for instance, where the historical school opposes this method to the old systematic treatment of economics. It is the demand for induction, as opposed to the self-sufficiency of system-making deduction. For example: "The history of English factory legislation," says Simmel, "is a better means of teaching the relation between Egoism and Altruism than the most acute analysis of these ideas. The relation of Religion and Morality cannot be so clearly revealed by any philosophic construction, however sympathetic, as by an ethnological inquiry into their origins and the mutual influence which they exerted upon each other in their earliest forms."

Starting from this critical point of view, and with the deliberate

* See review of vol. i. in the JOURNAL of October, 1892.